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This paper uses a unique household data set collected in Vietnam to empirically test the 
necessary conditions for an extended version of the consumption risk-sharing 
hypothesis. The test explicitly incorporates self-production and uses natural disasters 
such as avian influenza, droughts, and floods to identify the effectiveness of market and 
non-market risk-sharing mechanisms. With these additional treatments, full risk sharing 
cannot be rejected, which suggests the presence of omitted variable bias in existing 
studies that reject full risk sharing. We also find that credit constraints have a significant 
impact, although limited commitment is not necessarily serious. 
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1. Introduction 
 
In the past 15 years, there has been remarkable progress in formulating and 
testing full consumption risk sharing (Townsend, 1987; Mace, 1991; Cochrane, 1991; 
Townsend, 1994; Udry, 1994; Hayashi, Altonji, and Kotlikoff, 1996; Ligon, 1998; 
Dercon, Stefan, and Pramila Krishnan, 2000; Ogaki and Zhang, 2001; Murgai et al., 
2002; Fafchamps and Lund, 2003; Dubois et al., 2008; Ligon, 2008; Kinnan, 2010; 
Laczo, 2010). According to the canonical model of consumption risk sharing, 
idiosyncratic changes in household income should be absorbed by all other members 
within the same insurance network when the market is complete. Thus, when aggregate 
shocks are controlled for, idiosyncratic income shocks should not affect consumption 
when risk sharing is efficient. Existing studies on the full risk-sharing hypothesis 
typically use changes in household income, employment status, and health status from 
multipurpose household panel survey data as a proxy for idiosyncratic shock variables.   
Because tests of full risk sharing using data from developing countries tend to 
reject this hypothesis, researchers have elaborated on models incorporating various 
sources of friction to account for the partial risk sharing that is evident in the data 
(Ligon, 2008). Such friction includes limited commitment constraints and moral hazard 
under asymmetric information. Ligon (1998) uses panel data from India to test a moral 
hazard–constrained insurance model against the canonical full insurance and permanent 
income models. Dubois et al. (2008) use Pakistani household panel data to develop and 
test a model with limited commitment and incomplete formal contracts. Using panel 
data from rural Thailand to construct models of limited commitment, moral hazard, and 
hidden income to explain the incomplete nature of informal insurance, Kinnan (2010)   3
finds that the predictions of the hidden income model are supported by the data. 
An alternative strategy for explaining the lack of full consumption risk sharing 
is to mitigate estimation biases arising from various econometric problems (Ravallion 
and Chaudhuri, 1997; Ogaki and Zhang, 2001).
1 By relaxing assumptions on the 
functional form of utility, Ogaki and Zhang (2001) find evidence in support of the full 
risk-sharing hypothesis at the village level. However, they replicate the results of 
previous research, that is, the full risk-sharing hypothesis is rejected with a constant 
relative risk aversion utility, a utility that is widely used in the literature. Their results 
suggest that errors due to econometric specification are not negligible. 
In the present paper, we use a unique data set collected in Vietnam to make 
three main contributions to the literature. First, we mitigate a possibly important source 
of specification error: a failure to distinguish purchased consumption from 
self-produced consumption. More specifically, we apply Lewis’s (1996) framework, 
which investigates international risk sharing with non-tradable goods, in the context of a 
village economy. Based on this framework, the canonical test of consumption risk 
sharing is likely to suffer from omitted variable bias. The direction of the bias is 
positive if income changes and changes in self-production are positively correlated. To 
implement our framework empirically, we use a unique data set from Vietnam that 
explicitly distinguishes purchased consumption from self-production. 
Second, we use information about natural disasters as sources of exogenous 
variations to test the consumption risk-sharing hypothesis. Existing studies on risk 
sharing typically use income changes as idiosyncratic shock variables to test the full 
                                                  
1  Yet, Ravallion and Chaudhuri (1997) found that the existing studies may involve bias 
toward the null hypothesis of full-insurance.   4
consumption risk-sharing hypothesis.
2 However, these variables are not necessarily 
exogenous to households, resulting in possible estimation biases arising from 
endogeneity, measurement error, and/or problems with private information (Ravallion 
and Chaudhuri, 1997; Ligon, 1998, 2008). Natural disasters provide for an exceptionally 
clean experimental situation in which one can test whether households are able to insure 
for at least three reasons. First, natural disasters are intrinsically exogenous and cannot 
be affected by households. Second, natural disasters can cause large enough losses that 
the noise-to-signal ratios in the disaster-related shock variables are significantly small 
and the data are less susceptible to attenuation bias arising from measurement error. 
Third, whereas the shock variables in existing studies are likely to be private 
information (e.g., income), losses caused by natural disasters are typically large enough 
to be visible and easily verifiable. Hence, the assumption of perfect information is less 
problematic. Because Vietnam has experienced a variety of natural disasters and 
epidemics, such as avian influenza, typhoons, floods, and droughts, it provides ample 
data related to natural disasters to be used in empirical analyses.
3 
Finally, in order to explore the reasons behind the acceptance of the full 
consumption risk-sharing hypothesis, we incorporate two sources of friction, that is, 
limited credit access and limited commitment. Unlike existing studies such as Kinnan 
(2010) and Laczo (2010), our strategy is to use direct information on commitment 
                                                  
2  Strictly speaking, the term full risk sharing is not precise, since the risk concerning 
consumption of home produced goods is not shared in our model below. However, we 
use the term full risk sharing by following the convention in the literature. 
3  United Nations International Strategy for Disaster Reduction (2009) categorized 
countries in the world into 5 groups according to their vulnerability and resilience to 
disaster loss and their developmental limitations, particularly their capacity to benefit 
from international trade. Vietnam is categorized as a member of Group 4, that is, 
countries that are highly vulnerable economically to natural hazards.   5
constraints as well as credit constraints. 
With an explicit consideration of self-production and the use of natural disaster 
shock as an instrumental variable for income changes, we find that the full consumption 
risk-sharing hypothesis cannot be rejected. Our results suggest that the results of the 
previous studies, which have tended to reject the full risk-sharing hypothesis, involve 
omitted variable bias arising from self-production. This bias could be particularly 
serious in village economies, because self-production may make up a considerable 
amount of total consumption.   
This paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we present the theoretical and 
econometric framework for our analysis. In Section 3, we explain the survey data, and 
in Section 4, we present the empirical results. In Section 5, we present the results based 
on empirical models with credit access or limited commitment constraints. This is 
followed by concluding remarks in Section 6.   
 
2. Theoretical and Econometric Framework 
 
In this section, we explain the theoretical and econometric frameworks that are 
used in testing the full risk-sharing hypothesis in this paper. We first explain the 
theoretical framework, followed by the econometric framework. 
In the standard framework, full consumption risk sharing can be characterized 
as the solution to a benevolent social planner’s problem that maximizes the weighted 
sum of people’s lifetime utilities given social resource constraints (Mace, 1991; 
Cochrane, 1991; Townsend, 1004). In addition, we follow an approach by Lewis (1996) 
that incorporates the consumption of non-tradable goods in testing the international   6
consumption risk-sharing hypothesis. An analogous extension that separates purchased 
consumption and self-production is crucial in our village setting, because consumption 
of self-produced farm products accounts for a large portion of total consumption. As 
will be explained below, ignoring the consumption of self-produced goods (or 
non-traded goods) may lead to omitted variable bias.   
Consider an economy, which can be a village or a district, that is composed of 
N infinitely lived households, each facing serially independent income draws. Assume 
also that no storage is possible, which rules out the possibility of self-insurance. While 
we relegate the justification for the formulation in the Appendix, here we set up a social 
planner’s problem for an economy with J infinitely lived households with consumption 
of self-produced goods that provides conditions for full consumption risk sharing. The 
problem is analogous to the one in Lewis (1996), in which a distinction between 
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where j is the Pareto-Negishi weight attached to household j; t denotes time; π(st) is the 





j(st)  are  j’s purchased consumption (or tradables) and consumption of 
                                                  
4  In the context of agricultural household models, de Janvry, Fafchamps, and Sadoulet 
(1991) refer to self-production as non-tradables.   7
self-produced goods (or non-tradables) in state st, respectively; y
T
j(st) is j’s tradable 
portion of the initial endowment; and y
N
j(st) is j’s self-produced or non-tradable portion 
of the initial endowment.   
The first-order conditions of this problem with respect to purchased 
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where  μ(st) is the Lagrangian multiplier associated with the purchased consumption 
constraint in problem (1). Following Baxter and Jermann (1999) and Lewis (1996), a 
log-linearization of these first-order conditions gives the following testable equation: 
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i(st) for all st; and uit is a well-behaved error term. Note 
that this formulation assumes that the income changes  it y  are idiosyncratic, which is a 
typical assumption made in the existing studies on consumption risk-sharing. Then the 
consumption risk-sharing hypothesis is supported when βZ = 0 holds. Note that in 
equation (2), α includes the average growth rate of tradables consumption within each 
risk-sharing network. Another important coefficient to be estimated is β1, which 
involves the share of tradables in expenditures and the elasticity of substitution between   8
tradables and non-tradables. By following Baxter and Jermann (1999) and Lewis (1996), 
we can approximate the elasticity of substitution between tradables and non-tradables 
by (1 - β1)(1 - xT)/[γ(β1 xT + 1 - xT)], where xT is the share of tradables in expenditures 
and γ is the parameter of relative risk aversion. 
  Because total consumption expenditure is a composite of tradables and 
non-tradables, we can use the geometric weighted average of tradables and 
non-tradables to express total consumption, c; that is, ln c = w ln c
T
it + (1 - w) ln c
N
it. 
Then, following Backus and Smith (1993), equation (2) can be rewritten as follows: 
 
( 3 )         Δ ln cit = a + b 1Δ ln c
N
it + bZ Δ ln yi + εit, 
 
where a = wα, b1 = wβ1 + (1 - w), and bZ = wβZ. In equation (3), the full consumption 
risk-sharing hypothesis is represented by the condition bZ = 0. Because the canonical 
test of consumption risk sharing excludes the term for non-tradables consumption, Δ ln 
c
N
it, such a test might involve omitted variable bias arising from self-production under 
non-separable utility.   
  However, income changes variables are not necessarily exogenous to a 
household, resulting in possible estimation biases arising from endogeneity, 
measurement error, and/or problems with private information. To mitigate such 
problems, when estimating equations (2) and (3), we use natural disaster shock 
information as instrumental variables for income changes as well as self-production 
changes. As an unexpected, exogenous event that cannot be affected by households, a 
natural disaster provides for an unusual and clean experimental situation under which 
one can test whether households are able to insure. Moreover, a disaster can cause large   9
enough damage so that the noise-to-signal ratio in the disaster-related shock variable is 
significantly small and the data are less susceptible to attenuation bias arising from 
measurement error. Also, whereas the shock variables in existing studies are likely to be 
private information rather than public knowledge, damage caused by natural disasters is 
visible and easily verifiable. Hence, the assumption of perfect information is less 
problematic. 
 
3. Data and Descriptive Statistics 
 
In the present study, we use a combination of two data sets: (1) the Vietnam 
Household Living Standards Survey (VHLSS) 2006 data and (2) data from a 
resurveying of VHLSS 2006 respondents collected jointly by the Research Institute of 
Economy, Trade and Industry (RIETI) and the Center for Agricultural Policy in Vietnam 
(CAP; hereafter, the RIETI-CAP data).   
The VHLSS is a biennial, nationally representative, rotating-panel household 
survey conducted by the General Statistics Office with technical assistance from United 
Nations Development Programme (UNDP) and the World Bank. This multipurpose 
household survey covers a variety of topics, such as household characteristics, 
expenditures, income, health, and education. Enumeration areas are chosen randomly 
from the 1999 Population Census enumeration areas, and households are selected 
randomly from each enumeration area. VHLSS 2006 covers approximately 46,000 
households, of which approximately 9,000 include both the income and expenditure 
modules (the rest include only the income module) apart from other basic information.   
The income module identifies the income that each household member received   10
in the form of salary/wages or self-employment from a given industry, for example, 
agriculture, fishery, forestry, industry, construction, and trade and services, as well as 
from other sources, for example, remittance. The expenditures module provides very 
detailed information on bought or bartered items as well as the consumption of 
self-produced items and gifts. These data include both aggregate as well as itemized 
data.  
 The RIETI-CAP survey was designed to resurvey subsamples of VHLSS 2006 
households from late February 2008 through early April 2008. We looked at past losses 
from avian influenza and flooding, which is one of the most common natural disasters 
in Vietnam. As a result, the following four provinces were chosen for the resurvey: (1) 
Ha Tay (hit only by avian influenza), (2) Nghe An (hit only by flooding), (3) Quang 
Nam (hit by both avian influenza and flooding), and (4) Lao Cai (hit by neither avian 
influenza nor flooding). The RIETI-CAP includes data from households both with and 
without the VHLSS 2006 expenditures module. The survey covers around 500 
households for each province, for a total of 2,018 households. The survey includes a 
variety of data, such as changes in income and in expenditures, changes in asset 
holdings, insurance subscriptions, borrowing situations, past losses due to epidemics 
and natural disasters, willingness to pay for various hypothetical insurance schemes, and 
preferences regarding uncertainty and time. The income and the expenditures modules 
of the survey were designed to be compatible with VHLSS 2006, although the data are 
not as detailed as VHLSS data: Rather than asking about levels, the RIETI-CAP survey 
contains data regarding the rates of change in income (total and itemized) and/or   11
expenditures/consumption (total and itemized).
5  
Table 1 reports descriptive statistics for the variables used in this paper. Note 
that the variables regarding natural disasters and epidemics are the numbers of disasters 
or epidemics experienced in the past five years (as of 2008). Among them, the variable 
“typhoons” includes hail as well as typhoons, and the variable “epidemics” includes 
both avian influenza and other epidemics. Household size is the number of household 
members. Figure 1 shows the distribution of the value of consumption of self-produced 
goods to the total value of consumption.   
 
4. Empirical Results 
 
Table 2 reports the estimation results for equation (2). It indicates that in the 
estimation of equation (2) by simple ordinary least squares (specification [1]), the 
coefficient of income becomes significant, and thus the consumption risk-sharing 
hypothesis is rejected. The qualitative results remain the same even if we use 
instrumental variable estimations for self-production and income change variables 
(specifications [2] and [3]), or even if we include province fixed effects (specification 
[4], [5], and [6]) on top of that. The first-stage regression results for income and 
self-production variables are shown in Tables 7 and 8, respectively.   
The last two specifications [8] and [9] in Table 2, however, indicate otherwise. 
When the commune fixed effect is taken into account in the IV specifications, the 
income coefficient turns out to be statistically insignificant. In these cases, we cannot 
                                                  
5  To mitigate potential bias from retrospective questions on change rates, we follow a 
procedure suggested by Nakata et al. (2010). All the qualitative results are maintained 
even if we handle retrospective bias.     12
reject the full consumption risk-sharing hypothesis, suggesting that risk-sharing 
networks function effectively at the commune level.   
Table 3 reports the estimation results using total consumption expenditure as 
the dependent variable based on the canonical specification used by Townsend (1994) 
and those corresponding to equation (3), that is, results for the specification that reflect 
non-tradables. There are three important findings. First, coefficients of the income 
change variables are significant in all cases except for the model with the 
self-production variable and commune fixed effects in specifications [17] and [18]. 
Second, once we include both the self-production variable and commune fixed effects, 
income change coefficients are statistically insignificant (specifications [17] and [18]). 
These results imply that although risk-sharing networks may function effectively within 
each commune, the inter-community risk-sharing mechanism is weak. Third, with 
non-tradable goods, the coefficients of income become systematically smaller than 
those without non-tradables. This suggests that the omission of the self-production 
variable involves omitted variable bias. Indeed, the correlation coefficient between the 
log of non-tradable goods and the log of income is positive (0.3183) and statistically 
significant. As a consequence, the coefficient of the log of income would have an 
upward bias in the short specifications without non-tradables. 
In sum, our estimation results indicate that the full consumption risk-sharing 
hypothesis holds if we consider a village-level risk-sharing network. Yet for larger 
networks (e.g., at the province level), our results do not support full risk sharing. 
Although we replicate the results found by Townsend (1994), the results change if we 
include self-production according to equation (3). These results suggest that the 
canonical consumption risk-sharing test à la Townsend (1994) should have involved   13
omitted variable bias arising from self-production under non-separable utility. 
 
Estimation of the Elasticity of Substitution 
 
According to equation (8) of Lewis (1996), we are able to identify the elasticity 
of substitution between tradables and non-tradables by the formula (1 - β1)(1 - xT)/[γ(β1 
xT + 1 - xT)]. To this end, we need data on the relative risk aversion parameter, γ, to 
identify the elasticity of substitution. In order to elicit risk preference parameters, we 
followed Anderson et al. (2004) and carefully designed our structured questionnaire. 
More specifically, we assumed the constant relative risk aversion utility function and 
identified the ranges of the relative risk-aversion parameter γ by using the responses to 
the following questions:   
“Imagine a fair coin flip. Choose the option that you prefer by circling (a) or (b) for 
each pair below. 
 4-1 (a) Whatever the outcome (heads or tails), you receive 30,000 VND; or (b) 
If the outcome is heads, you receive 60,000 VND, but you receive nothing if it 
is tails.   
 4-2 (a) Whatever the outcome (heads or tails), you receive 30,000 VND; or (b) 
If the outcome is heads, you receive 75,000 VND, but you receive nothing if it 
is tails.”  
The summary of the observed relative risk aversion parameter is shown in Table 4. For 
more than 60 percent of respondents, their degree of relative risk aversion exceeds 0.24. 
Tanaka et al. (2010) conducted artefactual field experiments among respondents to the 
2002 Vietnam Living Standard Measurement Survey. Their results indicate relative risk   14
aversion parameters of 0.37 for respondents in the south and 0.41 for those in the north. 
To account for possible measurement error, we use a range of risk aversion parameters, 
namely, 0.4, 1, 2, and 4, to compute the elasticity of substitution.
6  
The distribution of the elasticity of substitution is shown in Figure 2. As can be 
seen from this figure, the overall elasticity is very small. This implies that purchased 
consumption items and self-produced consumption items are imperfect substitutes, 
suggesting the importance of distinguishing between these two items.   
 
5. Friction to Perfect Consumption Risk Sharing 
 
In order to explore the reasons behind the acceptance of the full consumption 
risk-sharing hypothesis, we incorporate two sources of friction, that is, limited credit 
access and limited commitment.   
 
Limited Credit Access 
 
We first test the validity of consumption risk sharing framework among those 





it, for those who are credit constrained to the optimization 
problem of (1). In this case, we should observe that βZ  > 0 for credit-constrained 
households in equation (2).   
To elicit the credit constraint information, following Scott (2000), we carefully 
                                                  
6  For the coefficient of non-tradable consumption β1, we use the result from 
specification [18] in Table 3.     15
designed the questionnaire so that the credit constraints could be identified directly from 
the data set. The procedure was as follows: Household heads were asked about their 
experiences borrowing from formal and informal sources, such as government agencies, 
agricultural development banks, commercial banks, credit unions, cooperatives, 
nongovernmental organizations, microfinanciers, pawnshops, ROSCA (Choi Ho or Hui), 
landlords, employers, relatives, and friends during the past 12 months. We defined two 
indicator variables of credit constraints that were weak and strict versions of indicators: 
The strong indicator was for those who faced binding constraints in both 2006 and 2007, 
and the weak indicator was for those who faced binding constraints in either 2006 or 
2007. We first asked whether a household had attempted to obtain a loan. Then, for 
those who had tried to borrow money, we asked whether the household was able to 
borrow the total amount requested. If the answer was yes, we identified the household 
as being unconstrained. In contrast, we identified those households whose loan requests 
had been rejected or accepted on a partial-amount basis as being credit constrained. We 
asked respondents who had not attempted to borrow about the reason for not availing 
themselves of a bank loan. Those who selected “no need for credit” from among the 
answer choices were considered as being unconstrained with regard to formal and/or 
informal credit sources. This is the weak version of the credit constraint indicator.   
The estimation results of equations (2) and (3) reported in Table 5 are based 
only on the sample of credit-constrained respondents. These results indicate that the full 
consumption risk-sharing hypothesis is now rejected among those who are credit 
constrained in two out of four “full” specifications, namely, the specifications in which 
we controlled for self-production and used natural disaster shock as instrumental   16
variables for self-production and income changes.
7 This result suggests that credit 




Because a third party does not enforce risk-sharing arrangements, there is an 
issue of limited commitment in consumption risk sharing (Kocherlakota, 1996; Ligon, 
Thomas, and Worrall, 2002; Ligon, 2008; Kinnan, 2010; Laczo, 2010). Limited 
commitment arises when some households receive unusually high incomes. This is 
simply because such households are required to make large transfers to others under full 
insurance arrangements and thus have an incentive to leave the insurance network. 
Under such cases, we need to formulate a risk sharing model with a limited commitment 
constraint, as is shown in Kocherlakota (1996), Ligon, Thomas, and Worrall (2002), 
Kinnan (2010), and Laczo (2010). Strictly speaking, we need to solve problem (1) under 
an additional constraint for commitment: 
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This constraint shows that the expected utility of a household from staying within the 
insurance network is no less than the expected utility under autarky. A testable 
                                                  
7  Although the full consumption risk-sharing hypothesis is rejected among those who 
are credit constrained (Table 5), the hypothesis is not rejected when we estimate an 
interaction variable of a dummy variable of credit constraints and income. The latter 
result is not presented in the paper, but is available upon request.       17
implication of such a model is that idiosyncratic income and individual consumption 
should co-move because households with higher income shocks should be given larger 
consumption to stay within the insurance network.   
Unlike Kinnan (2010) and Laczo (2010), our strategy is to use direct 
information on commitment constraints. From the commune data from VHLSS 2006, 
we can identify the communities that have experienced internal conflicts. We presume 
that such communities are facing commitment problems. More specifically, the survey 
includes the following question: “What are the current most thorny social issues in the 
commune?” If the answer to this question includes “burglary” or “conflict/disunity,” the 
commitment constraint dummy takes a value of 1. Then our empirical approach is to 
include the dummy variable for binding commitment constraints in risk sharing 
equations (2) or (3) to estimate the coefficient of an interaction variable of the dummy 
and income change variables. If the estimated coefficient is positive and statistically 
significant, then the result is consistent with consumption risk sharing under the binding 
commitment constraint. Table 6 shows the estimation results. The interaction terms of 
the limited commitment dummy and income change variables are positive in three out 
of four specifications, but these coefficients are statistically insignificant.
8 This result 
suggests that limited commitment is not necessarily serious in communities in Vietnam.   
This is consistent with a finding by Kinnan (2010). 
                                                  
8 For a robustness check of the results, we estimate the model by using two different 
subsamples; (a) households from communes where the either burglary or 
conflict/disunity is the most serious issue in the commune, and (b) households from 
communes where either burglary and/or conflict/disunity is among the most three 
serious issues in the commune. In either case, the consumption risk sharing model is not 
rejected. These results are available upon request. 
   18
6. Concluding Remarks 
 
In this paper, we use unique household data from Vietnam collected by 
resurveying respondents to the VHLSS 2006. These data allow us to statistically test the 
necessary conditions for consumption risk sharing in detail. The main contributions of 
our study are threefold. First, we augment the canonical approach to testing the 
risk-sharing hypothesis by explicitly considering self-production. By doing so, we aim 
to examine the importance of heterogeneities in consumption. Second, we use data on 
natural disasters such as avian influenza, droughts, and floods to investigate the 
effectiveness of market and non-market mechanisms against natural disasters. Third, we 
examine the effects of two potential sources of friction—limited credit access and 
limited commitment—on full consumption risk sharing within a community. 
With an explicit treatment of self-production and a use of natural disaster 
shocks as instrumental variables for income changes, we find that the full consumption 
risk-sharing hypothesis cannot be rejected. Our results suggest that the results of 
previous studies that have tended to reject the full risk-sharing hypothesis involve 
omitted variable bias arising from the lack of an explicit consideration of 
self-production. We also find that credit access is an important source of risk sharing but 
that limited commitment is not necessarily serious in Vietnamese villages.   
Our results may suggest that the lack of efficient informal insurance 
mechanisms is compensated for by self-production. Because industrialization may 
lessen this role of self-production as a self-insurance device, it is important to mitigate 
risks associated with self-production by designing formal ex ante risk-management 
mechanisms against natural disasters. For example, the development of markets for   19
index-type insurance associated with agricultural production would be an important 
topic in future research.     20
References  
 
Anderson, C. Leigh, Maya Dietz, Andrew Gordon, and Marieka Klawitter (2004), 
“Discount Rates in Vietnam.” Economic Development and Cultural Change 52(4), 
873-887. 
 
Baxter, Marianne, and Urban J. Jermann (1999), “Household Production and the Excess 
Sensitivity of Consumption to Current Income.” American Economic Review 89(4), 
902-920.  
 
Cochrane, John H. (1991). “A Simple Test of Consumption Insurance.” Journal of 
Political Economy 99(5), 957-976. 
 
De Janvry, Alain, Marcel Fafchamps, and Elizabeth Sadoulet (1991), “Peasant 
Household Behavior with Missing Markets: Some Paradoxes Explained,” Economic 
Journal 101(409), 1400-1417. 
 
Dercon, Stefan, and Pramila Krishnan (2000), “In Sickness and in Health: Risk Sharing 
within Households in Rural Ethiopia,” Journal of Political Economy 108(4), 688-727. 
 
Dubois, Pierre, Bruno Jullien, and Thierry Magnac (2008), Formal and Informal Risk 
Sharing in LDCs: Theory and Empirical Evidence, Econometrica 76(4), 679-725. 
 
Fafchamps, Marcel, and Susan Lund (2003), “Risk-Sharing Networks in Rural 
Philippines,” Journal of Development Economics 71(2), 261-287. 
 
Hayashi, Fumio, Joseph Altonji, and Laurence Kotlikoﬀ (1996), “Risk-Sharing Between 
and Within Families,” Econometrica 64(2), 261-94. 
 
Kinnan, Cynthia (2010), “Distinguishing barriers to insurance in Thai villages” 
mimeographed, MIT. <http://econ-www.mit.edu/files/5476> 
 
Kocherlakota, Narayana R. (1996), “Implications of Efficient Risk Sharing without 
Commitment,” The Review of Economic Studies 63(4), 595-609. 
 
Laczo, Sarolta (2010), “Estimating Dynamic Contracts: Risk Sharing in Village 
Economies,” mimeographed, Toulouse School of Economics and European University 
Institute. <http://staff.etla.fi/maattanen/laczo.pdf> 
 
Lewis, Karen (1996), “What Can Explain the Apparent Lack of International 
Consumption Risk-Sharing?” Journal of Political Economy 104(2), 267-297. 
 
Ligon, Ethan (2008), Risk sharing. In New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics. Palgrave 
Macmillan, 2nd edition.   21
 
Ligon, Ethan (1998), “Risk Sharing and Information in Village Economics,” Review of 
Economic Studies 65(4), 847-64.   
 
Ligon, Ethan, Jonathan P. Thomas, and Tim Worrall (2002), “Informal Insurance 
Arrangements with Limited Commitment: Theory and Evidence from Village 
Economies,” Review of Economic Studies, 69(1):209-244, 2002. 
 
Mace, Barbara J. (1991), “Full Insurance in the Presence of Aggregate Uncertainty,” 
Journal of Political Economy 99(5), 928-996. 
 
Murgai, Rinku, Paul Winters, Elisabeth Sadoulet, and Alain de Janvry (2002), 
“Localized and Incomplete Mutual Insurance,” Journal of Development Economics 67, 
245-274. 
 
Nakata, Hiroyuki, Yasuyuki Sawada, and Mari Tanaka (2010), “Asking Retrospective 
Questions in Household Surveys: Evidence from Vietnam,” RIETI Discussion Paper 
10-E-008. 
 
Ogaki, Masao, and Qian Zhang (2001), “Decreasing Relative Risk Aversion and Tests of 
Risk Sharing,” Econometrica, 69, 515-26. 
 
Ravallion, Martin and Shubham Chaudhuri (1997), “Risk and Insurance in Village 
India: Comment,” Econometrica 65 (1), 171-184.   
 
Tanaka, Tomomi, Colin F. Camerer, and Quang Nguyen (2010) “Risk and Time 
Preferences: Linking Experimental and Household Survey Data from Vietnam,” 
American Economic Review, 100(1), 557–71.   
 
Townsend, Robert M. (1994). “Risk and Insurance in Village India,” Econometrica 
62(3), 539-591. 
 
Townsend, Robert M. (1987), “Arrow-Debreu Programs as Microfoundations of 
Macroeconomics,” In T. Bewley, ed., Advanced in Economic Theory: Fifth World 
Congress, Cambridge University Press, 379-428. 
 
Udry, C. (1994), “Risk and Insurance in a Rural Credit Market: An Empirical 
Investigation in Northern Nigeria,” Review of Economic Studies 61, 495-526. 
 
UNISDR (2009), Global Assessment Report on Disaster Risk Reduction, United 
Nations International Strategy for Disaster Reduction Secretariat: Geneva. 
 
   22
Appendix: Justification of the Social Planner Problem 
 
Consider an economy with J households (indexed by j = 1, 2, …, J) and I goods 
(indexed by i = 1, 2, …, I). Suppose that each household j has its own production 
function f
H
ji for each good i (we call this a home production function). The home 
production function maps the labor input z
H
ji to its output, which is denoted by y
H
ji. 
However, another set of technologies uses the labor input of multiple households, which 
we call the industrialized production. Let z
M
ji denote household j’s labor input for the 

























i is the output of the industrialized production of good i. 
 
Let cji denote household j’s consumption of good i. The feasibility constraint of the 
economy will therefore be 
 














ji denote household j’s consumption of its own home production of good i. 
Note that by definition, c ji
H  y ji
H  f ji
H z ji
H  , household j will be self-sufficient 
concerning good i if cji = c
H
ji. Moreover, household j does not trade (i.e., buy or sell) 




ji. This leads to the following definitions: 
 









ji holds for all j. 
(c) Good i is fully tradable if it is non-tradable for no j. 
(d) Good i is partially tradable if it is non-tradable for some j. 
 
Note that if good i is non-tradable, then y
M
i = 0 holds as long as no free disposal is 
allowed. Now, if all goods are non-tradable (i.e., if there is autarky), it is easy to see that 
condition (A-1) must be replaced with cji = y
H
ji  f o r  a l l  i, j. Clearly, the condition cji = 
y
H
ji for all i, j implies condition (A-1) but not vice versa; that is, the autarky condition is   23
more restrictive than condition (A-1). 
 
Let  J  1, 2, ..., J   and  Ji  j  J:c ji  y ji
H  , that is, the set of households for 
whom good i is non-tradable. Also, let I 1, 2, ..., I    and 
I
N  i  I:Ji is non-empty  , that is, the set of goods that are partially tradable or 
non-tradable. Now, if there is some good i that is partially tradable, that is, I
N is 
non-empty, then condition (A-1) must be replaced with 
(A-2)   c ji
j1
J





M,   i  I\I
N, 
(A-3)   c ji
jJ\Ji




M,   i  I
N, 
(A-4)   c ji  y ji
H,   j  Ji, i  I
N. 
 
Note that condition (A-2) is for fully tradable goods, condition (A-3) is for partially 
tradable goods, and condition (A-4) is for partially tradable or non-tradable goods. 
Observe that conditions (A-2), (A-3), and (A-4) imply condition (A-1) but not vice 
versa. In other words, the three conditions are more restrictive than condition (A-1). 
 
The social optimum of the economy with the presence of some partially tradable goods 





max  jU j c j1, c j2, , c jI; L j 
j1
J
     subject to (A-2), (A- 3) and (A- 4), 
 
where   j is some positive weight (Pareto-Negishi weight) and Lj is household j’s 
leisure, that is, time available minus labor. Now, as long as  I
N  is non-empty, condition 
(A-4) is present, and good i  I
N is non-tradable for at least some households. It 
follows that a generic form of the social planner’s problem in Lewis (1996) applies here, 
unless all goods are perfect substitutes. Note that this holds true even if the same good is 
non-tradable for some households but not for other households, that is, only the 
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Table 1   
Descriptive Statistics 
Variable Code  Obs.  Mean  Std.  Dev
First difference of log tradable consumption  tradable  2003  0.112  0.109 
First difference of log non-tradable consumption  non-tradable  1850  0.080  0.122 
First difference of log total income  income1    2006  0.101  0.098 
First difference of log total consumption  total  1847  0.104  0.100 
Total number of disasters in 2007  disaster1  4010  0.290  0.545 
Total number of disasters in 2006  disaster2  4010  0.174  0.412 
Number of landslides in 2007  geo_2007    4010  0.002  0.050 
Number of landslides in 2006  geo_2006  4010  0.001  0.035 
Number of typhoons in 2007  meteo_2007    4010  0.051  0.220 
Number of typhoons in 2006  meteo_2006  4010  0.078  0.270 
Number of floods in 2007  hydro_2007  4010  0.098  0.301 
Number of floods in 2006  hydro_2006  4010  0.025  0.156 
Number of droughts in 2007  climato_2007 4010 0.017  0.131 
Number of droughts in 2006  climato_2006   4010 0.006  0.080 
Number of epidemics in 2007  bio_2007  4010  0.084  0.287 
Number of epidemics in 2006  bio_2006  4010  0.058  0.238 
Number of other disasters in 2007  other_2007  4010  0.037  0.192 
Number of other disasters in 2006  other_2006    4010  0.005  0.074 
Value of real estate in 2006 (in thousand VND)  land  2014  2722.815  21656.110
Value of capital assets in 2006 (in thousand VND)  asset3  2014  22251.570  47480.960
Household size in 2006  num  2014  4.252  1.716 
Income level in 2006 (in thousand VND)  income06  2014  29232.530  73354.400
Credit constraint dummy (1 if both 2006 and 2007 
credit constraints are binding) 
constraint 2014  0.295   
Credit constraint dummy (1 if either 2006 or 2007 
credit constraint is binding) 
constraint2 2014  0.408   
Limited commitment dummy (1 if a limited 
commitment constraint is binding) 
limited 4171  0.122   
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Table 2 
Test of Consumption Risk Sharing 
[Based on Equation (2), Dependent Variable: Δ ln c
T] 
 
Specification  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
Method  OLS IV(5) IV(6) OLS IV(5) IV(6) OLS IV(5) IV(6) 
Province fixed effect    No  No  No  Yes  Yes  Yes  No  No  No 
Commune  fixed  effect  No No No No No No Yes  Yes  Yes 
Specification of the first-stage regression 
in Appendix Tables 1 and 2     (A)  (B)  (A)  (B)  (A)  (B) 
           
Δlog c
N+  0.330*** 0.507*** 0.509*** 0.310*** 0.469  0.677*** 0.321*** 0.684  0.791***
  [0.067] [0.106] [0.088] [0.063] [0.307] [0.157] [0.064] [0.444] [0.174] 
Δlog y +  0.303***  0.581*** 0.565*** 0.240*** 0.945** 0.451** 0.191***  0.511  0.253 
  [0.040] [0.165] [0.130] [0.049] [0.425] [0.208] [0.033] [0.569] [0.212] 
Constant  0.053***  0.01  0.01  0.061***   0.065***    
  [0.005] [0.013] [0.010] [0.004]     [0.006]    
           
Number of observations  1839 1813 1813 1839 1813 1813 1839 1812 1812 
R-squared  0.28 0.14 0.15 0.22 0.28 0.04 0.22 0.13 0.13 
Hansen J statistic    5.54  19.55    0.94  22.62    2.08  9.5 
Chi-sq(3)  P-val   0.14  0.11  0.82  0.05  0.56  0.73 
Number of provinces        34  34  34       
Number  of  communes         134  132  132 
           
Robust standard errors are in brackets. + represents an endogenous variable. Instrumental 
variables for self-generated production and income changes are as follows: For IV(5), log of the 
total number of natural disasters in 2006 and 2007, log of capital assets, log of real estate, and 
log of household size. For IV(6), log of the number of landslides, typhoons, floods, droughts, 
epidemics, and other disasters in 2006 and 2007; log of capital assets; log of real estate; and log 
of household size. ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
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Table 3   
Test of Consumption Risk Sharing 
[Based on Equation (3), Dependent Variable: Δ ln c] 
Specification  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7)  (8)  (9)  (10) (11)  (12)  (13)  (14)  (15)  (16)  (17)  (18) 
Method  OLS  OLS IV(5) IV(6) IV(5) IV(6) OLS OLS IV(5) IV(6) IV(5) IV(6) OLS  OLS IV(5) IV(6) IV(5) IV(6) 
Province  FE  No No No No No No Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes No No No No No No 
Commune  FE  No No No No No No No No No No No No Yes  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Specification of the 
first-stage regression in 
Appendix Tables 1 and 
2   
   (A)  (B)  (A)  (B)     (A)  (B)  (A)  (B)     (A)  (B)  (A)  (B) 
Δlog c
N+   0.471***    0.638***  0.658***  0.456***     0.503*  0.752***  0.463***     0.777**  0.899*** 
   [0.073]    [0.078]  [0.064]  [0.077]    [0.271]  [0.125]  [0.073]    [0.337]  [0.119] 
Δlog y +  0.447*** 0.258*** 0.973*** 1.033*** 0.469*** 0.430*** 0.352*** 0.211*** 1.482*** 1.067***  0.952**  0.409**  0.301*** 0.164*** 1.330*** 0.959***  0.436  0.171 
  [0.037] [0.037] [0.150] [0.109] [0.137] [0.100] [0.051] [0.043] [0.287] [0.178] [0.378] [0.164] [0.040] [0.024] [0.266] [0.181] [0.440] [0.145] 
Constant  0.059***  0.040***  0.007 0.006 0.006 0.007  0.069***  0.046***          0.074***  0.050***         
  [0.004] [0.005] [0.015] [0.011] [0.011] [0.008] [0.005] [0.003]          [0.004] [0.006]         
                    
Number  of  observations  1839 1839 1813 1813 1813 1813 1839 1839 1813 1813 1813 1813 1839 1839 1812 1812 1812 1812 
R-squared  0.19 0.49 0.07 0.13 0.37 0.38 0.12 0.43 0.12 0.14 0.12 0.21 0.09 0.45  0.1  0.15 0.14 0.11 
Hansen  J  statistic     23.02  29.84  5.97  19.56     2.3  18.85  1.02  20.63     2.32  18.58  1.12  8.67 
Chi-sq(3)  P-val      0  0.01 0.11 0.11      0.68 0.17  0.8  0.08      0.68 0.18 0.77  0.8 
Number of provinces         34  34  34  34  34  34        
Number of communes               134  134  132  132  132  132 
Robust standard errors are in brackets. + represents an endogenous variable. Instrumental variables for self-generated production and income changes are as follows: For 
IV(5), log of the total number of natural disasters in 2006 and 2007, log of capital assets, log of real estate, and log of household size. For IV(6), log of the number of 
landslides, typhoons, floods, droughts, epidemics, and other disasters in 2006 and 2007; log of capital assets; log of real estate; and log of household size. * significant at 10%; 
** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%  29
 
Table 4   
Ranges of the Relative Risk Aversion Parameter 
 
Range of γ Frequency Percentage
0 < γ 505  25.91 
0 < γ < 0.24  265  13.6 
0.24 > γ 1179  60.49 
    
Total 1949  100 
 
 
Table 5   
Test of Consumption Risk Sharing for the Credit-Constrained Group 
 
Specification (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Dependent Variable Δ ln c
T  Δ ln c
T  Δ ln c  Δ ln c 
Method IV(5) IV(6) IV(5) IV(6) 
Province fixed effect    No  No  No  No 
Commune  fixed  effect  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Specification of the first-stage regression in 
Appendix Tables 1 and 2    (A) (B) (A) (B) 
      
Δlog c
N+ 0.806  0.511***  0.809**  0.641*** 
  [0.500] [0.114] [0.388] [0.096] 
Δlog y + 0.162  0.413*  0.242  0.374** 
  [0.696] [0.229] [0.508] [0.165] 
Constant      
      
Number  of  observations  527 527 527 527 
R-squared  0.02 0.25 0.43 0.53 
Hansen J statistic  3.23  12.87  3.36  17.37 
Chi-sq(3)  P-val  0.36 0.46 0.34 0.18 
Number  of  communes  100 100 100 100 
Robust standard errors are in brackets. + represents an endogenous variable. Instrumental variables for self-generated 
production and income changes are as follows: For IV(5), log of the total number of natural disasters in 2006 and 2007, 
log of capital assets, log of real estate, and log of household size. For IV(6), log of the number of landslides, typhoons, 
floods, droughts, epidemics, and other disasters in 2006 and 2007; log of capital assets; log of real estate; and log of 
household size. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
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Table 6   
Test of Consumption Risk Sharing under Limited Commitment Constraints 
 
Specification (1) (2)  (3)  (4) 
Dependent Variable Δ ln c
T  Δ ln c
T  Δ ln c  Δ ln c 
Method IV(5) IV(6)  IV(5)  IV(6) 
Province fixed effect    No  No  No  No 
Commune fixed effect  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Specification of the first-stage 
regression in Appendix Tables 1 and 2   
(A) (B)  (A)  (B) 
        
Δlog c
N+ 0.677  0.780***  0.789**  0.923*** 
 [0.506]  [0.210]  [0.366]  [0.137] 
Δlog y + 0.361  0.248  0.346  0.15 
 [0.652]  [0.222]  [0.481]  [0.148] 
Δlog y *limited commitment dummy+  2.345  0.076  1.246  -0.265 
 [1.941]  [1.213]  [1.352]  [0.889] 
        
Number of observations  1812  1812  1812  1812 
R-squared 0.49  0.11  0.01  0.07 
Hansen J statistic  0.2  8.97  0.05  7.9 
Chi-sq(3) P-val  0.9  0.71  0.97  0.79 
Number of provinces         
Number of communes  132  132  132  132 
Robust standard errors in brackets. + represents an endogenous variable. Instrumental variables for self-generated 
production and income changes are as follows: For IV(5), log of the total number of natural disasters in 2006 and 2007, 
log of capital assets, log of real estate, and log of household size. For IV(6), log of the number of landslides, typhoons, 
floods, droughts, epidemics, and other disasters in 2006 and 2007; log of capital assets; log of real estate; and log of 
household size. ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%  31
Appendix Table 1   
First-Stage Regressions for Log of Income Growth 
[Dependent Variable: Δlog y] 
 
Specification  (A)  (B)  (A) (B) (A) (B) 
 IV(5)  IV(6)  IV(5)  IV(6)  IV(5)  IV(6) 
Province fixed effect  No  No  Yes  Yes  No  No 
Commune fixed effect  No  No  No  No  Yes  Yes 
            
lnland2 0.033***  0.027***  0.008  0.006  0.014  0.011 
 [0.009]  [0.008]  [0.008]  [0.008]  [0.009]  [0.009] 
lnnum2 0.028***  0.026***  0.010*  0.010*  0.009  0.01 
 [0.006]  [0.006]  [0.006]  [0.006]  [0.006]  [0.006] 
lnasset3 0.004**  0.005**  0.007*** 0.007*** 0.007***  0.007*** 
 [0.002]  [0.002]  [0.002]  [0.002]  [0.002]  [0.002] 
disaster1  -0.025***   0.001  -0.006  
  [0.007]    [0.008]  [0.008]  
lngeo_2007   0.106***    0.084***   0.041 
    [0.031]   [0.029]  [0.037] 
lnmetero_2007    -0.027   -0.001  -0.028 
    [0.018]   [0.020]  [0.026] 
lnhydro_2007    -0.023*  0.025   0.034* 
    [0.014]   [0.017]  [0.020] 
lnclimato_2007   -0.026**   0.004  0.011 
    [0.013]   [0.013]  [0.017] 
lnbio_2007    0.008   -0.002  -0.006 
    [0.011]   [0.010]  [0.011] 
lnother_2007   -0.064***    -0.030*    -0.044** 
    [0.011]   [0.017]  [0.017] 
lndisaster2  -0.019**    -0.006  -0.004  
  [0.008]    [0.008]  [0.009]  
lngeo_2006    0.046   0.035  0.013 
    [0.046]   [0.045]  [0.031] 
lnmeteo_2006   -0.033**   0.015  0.011 
    [0.015]   [0.021]  [0.025] 
lnhydro_2006    -0.060**  -0.028  -0.033 
    [0.027]   [0.023]  [0.029] 
lnclimato_2006   -0.081***   -0.025  -0.015 
    [0.019]   [0.020]  [0.019] 
lnbio_2006   0.011    -0.01    -0.003 
    [0.011]   [0.012]  [0.013] 
lnother_2006    -0.02   -0.007   -0.02 
    [0.052]   [0.052]  [0.051] 
Constant 0.013  0.014         
 [0.017]  [0.016]         
           
Number of observations  1813  1813  1812  1812  1812 1812 
R-squared 0.05  0.01  0.02  0.02  0.13 0.13 
F test: coeff. of IV = 0  8.65  5.86  5.73  2.72  2.08 9.5 
Prob > F  0  0  0  0  0.56 0.73 
Number of provinces    34        
Number of communes      132  132  132 132 
            
Robust standard errors are in brackets. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** 
significant at 1%   32
Appendix Table 2   
First-Stage Regressions for Log of Non-Tradable Consumption Growth 
[Dependent Variable: Δlog c
N] 
 
Specification  (A)  (B)  (A)  (B)  (A)  (B) 
 IV(5)  IV(6)  IV(5)  IV(6) IV(5) IV(6) 
Province fixed effect  No  No  Yes  Yes  No  No 
Commune fixed effect  No  No  No  No  Yes  Yes 
        
lnland2  0.033***  0.027***  0.008 0.006 0.014 0.011 
 [0.009]  [0.008]  [0.008]  [0.008]  [0.009]  [0.009] 
lnnum2 0.028***  0.026***  0.010*  0.010*  0.009  0.01 
  [0.006] [0.006] [0.006] [0.006] [0.006] [0.006] 
lnasset3  0.004**  0.005**  0.007*** 0.007*** 0.007*** 0.007*** 
  [0.002] [0.002] [0.002] [0.002] [0.002] [0.002] 
disaster1  -0.025***   0.001  -0.006  
  [0.007]  [0.008]  [0.008]  
lngeo_2007   0.106***  0.084***   0.041 
   [0.031]  [0.029]  [0.037] 
lnmetero_2007   -0.027  -0.001  -0.028 
   [0.018]  [0.020]  [0.026] 
lnhydro_2007   -0.023*    0.025    0.034* 
   [0.014]  [0.017]  [0.020] 
lnclimato_2007   -0.026**    0.004    0.011 
   [0.013]  [0.013]  [0.017] 
lnbio_2007   0.008  -0.002  -0.006 
   [0.011]  [0.010]  [0.011] 
lnother_2007   -0.064***    -0.030*    -0.044** 
   [0.011]  [0.017]  [0.017] 
lndisaster2  -0.019**   -0.006  -0.004  
  [0.008]  [0.008]  [0.009]  
lngeo_2006   0.046  0.035  0.013 
   [0.046]  [0.045]  [0.031] 
lnmeteo_2006   -0.033**    0.015    0.011 
   [0.015]  [0.021]  [0.025] 
lnhydro_2006    -0.060**   -0.028  -0.033 
   [0.027]  [0.023]  [0.029] 
lnclimato_2006    -0.081***   -0.025  -0.015 
   [0.019]  [0.020]  [0.019] 
lnbio_2006   0.011    -0.01    -0.003 
   [0.011]  [0.012]  [0.013] 
lnother_2006   -0.02   -0.007   -0.02 
   [0.052]  [0.052]  [0.051] 
Constant  0.013  0.014      
  [0.017]  [0.016]      
        
Number  of  observations  1813 1813 1813 1813 1812 1812 
R-squared  0.04 0.07 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.03 
F test: coeff. of IV = 0  13.13  10.63  6.05  3.6  4.93  2.49 
Prob  >  F  0 0 0 0 0 0 
Number of idcode      34  34     
Number of comid          132  132 
        
Robust standard errors are in brackets. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** 
significant at 1% 